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OPINION 
_______________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
Plaintiff-appellant Raymond C. Reynolds sued Defendants Department of the 
Army and Dr. Frances J. Harvey, Secretary of the Army, asserting claims of age 
discrimination and retaliation arising under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 
29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. (“ADEA”).1
As we write solely for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary for our 
decision.  In January 2004, Reynolds, a longtime employee of the Federal Government, 
began an engineering position with the U.S. Army in the On-The-Move Testbed section 
(“Testbed”) of the Communications-Electronics Research, Development, and 
Engineering Center, located in Fort Monmouth, New Jersey.  His supervisor was Norma 
Kornwebel.  She asserts that Reynolds did not take his job at the Testbed seriously, that 
  The District Court granted summary judgment in 
favor of Defendants, and Reynolds appealed.  We now affirm. 
I. Background 
                                              
1 The other defendants named in the complaint – Norma Kornwebel and John Does – 
were later dismissed from this case by stipulation, as were several additional state and 
federal law claims.   
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he improperly delegated responsibilities to others, and that he failed to comply with 
directives.  For his part, Reynolds generally denies Kornwebel’s allegations of poor job 
performance, and claims that she treated him dismissively from the start and failed to 
present him with a job description or position objectives. 
In August 2004, Kornwebel evaluated Reynolds’ performance, concluding that he 
had failed to meet two out of his seven job objectives.  For unclear reasons, she then 
waited for nearly two months before meeting with Reynolds about his evaluation and 
presenting him with a Performance Improvement Plan (“PIP”).  Under the PIP, he was 
given 90 days either to bring his performance to an acceptable level or face the possibility 
of reassignment, demotion, or termination.  On November 4, 2004, the day after he 
received the PIP, Reynolds applied for two early retirement incentive programs, the 
Voluntary Early Retirement Authority (“VERA”) and Voluntary Separation Incentive 
Pay (“VSIP”).  
In December 2004, Reynolds, then aged 51, submitted a complaint to the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission, raising allegations of age discrimination.  
Subsequently, Reynolds was offered a 90-day extension on his PIP, but was denied an 
extension of time for accepting VERA/VSIP benefits (for which he had by then been 
approved).  Reynolds declined the PIP extension, but states that he would have accepted 
the extension and remained working at the Testbed had he also received an extended 
window for electing VERA/VSIP. 
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On January 3, 2005, Reynolds exercised his early retirement option through 
VERA/VSIP.  In return, he received an incentive payment of $25,000 and a reduced 
annuity. 
II. Analysis 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment de novo, Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2010), but review 
its evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, Acumed LLC v. Advanced Surgical 
Servs., Inc., 561 F.3d 199, 211 (3d Cir. 2009).  We first address an evidentiary issue 
presented by this case, and then examine Reynolds’ age discrimination and retaliation 
claims in turn. 
A. Evidentiary Issue 
 To support his claim of age discrimination, Reynolds relied heavily on his own 
affidavit and that of Linda Castellano, Kornwebel’s former secretary.  Relying on Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)2
                                              
2 Effective December 1, 2010, Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 was amended.  The requirements for 
affidavits are now listed in subsection (c)(4) of the rule, as opposed to subsection (e), but 
they are substantially the same as they were before. 
 and District of New Jersey Local Rule 7.2(a), both of 
which require affidavits offered at summary judgment to be based on affiants’ personal 
knowledge, the District Court concluded that significant portions of the Reynolds and 
Castellano affidavits were flawed.  In particular, the Court determined that both affidavits 
contained numerous statements that were improper because they amounted to (i) legal 
argument, (ii) subjective views without any factual foundation, or (iii) unsupported 
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assertions made in the absence of personal knowledge.  Accordingly, the Court 
considered only “those statements . . . [that did] not suffer from the evidentiary 
deficiencies [it had] categorically described” in granting summary judgment.  Reynolds v. 
Dep’t of Army, 2010 WL 2674045, at *10 (D.N.J. 2010). 
 The District Court was unforgiving in its application of the relevant evidentiary 
rules, but it cannot be denied that the Reynolds and Castellano affidavits were rife with 
conclusory statements for which no basis in fact or personal knowledge was ever 
provided.3  For this reason, we cannot conclude that the District Court’s evidentiary 
determinations were “arbitrary, fanciful, or clearly unreasonable,” and we therefore 
uphold those determinations insofar as they are material to this opinion.4
                                              
3 To list but two examples (among many) of statements made without support, Castellano 
claimed that “in reality, placing an employee on a PIP is a step toward getting rid of 
them,” Castellano Aff. ¶ 107, and Reynolds asserted that “the PIP was a mere formality 
to terminate me . . . and I was thus forced to retire to avoid being terminated,” Reynolds 
Aff. ¶¶ 44-45, Oct. 19, 2009. 
4 At oral argument, we noted that a full deposition of Castellano would have made a 
valuable addition to the evidentiary record in this case and may have improved Reynolds’ 
chances of surviving summary judgment.  At that time, counsel for Reynolds—Ty 
Hyderally—stated that no such deposition had ever taken place.  Opposing counsel, 
however, informed us that Castellano had, in fact, been deposed in 2009, and that Mr. 
Hyderally was present at that deposition.  The latter stated during rebuttal that he did not 
recall being present, but has since conceded that he was.  Whether Mr. Hyderally’s error 
resulted from a lack of candor or mere unpreparedness, it was a mistake unbecoming an 
attorney appearing before a federal court. 
  See Acumed, 
561 F.3d at 211 (quotation marks omitted). 
B. Age Discrimination Claim 
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Where, as here, an age discrimination plaintiff relies on indirect evidence,5
 The Supreme Court has defined an adverse employment action as a “significant 
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with 
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in 
benefits.”  Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998); see also Weston v. 
Pennsylvania, 251 F.3d 420, 430-31 (3d Cir. 2001).  The action that had the most 
potential to satisfy this standard was Reynolds’ placement on a PIP.  As the District Court 
noted, however, other Circuit Courts have concluded that a PIP is not an adverse 
 we test 
the sufficiency of a claim at summary judgment using a slightly modified version of the 
burden-shifting framework articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 
792, 802 (1973).  Smith v. City of Allentown, 589 F.3d 684, 689 (3d Cir. 2009).  Under 
that framework, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by 
demonstrating four elements: “first, that the plaintiff is forty years of age or older; 
second, that the defendant took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; third, 
that the plaintiff was qualified for the position in question; and fourth, that the plaintiff 
was ultimately replaced by another employee who was sufficiently younger to support an 
inference of discriminatory animus.”  Id.  We agree with the District Court’s conclusion 
that Reynolds has not raised a dispute of material fact as to whether he was the subject of 
an adverse employment action, and has thus failed to set forth a prima facie case of 
discrimination. 
                                              
5 As the District Court properly concluded, the record in this case contains no direct 
evidence of discrimination. 
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employment action absent accompanying changes to pay, benefits, or employment status. 
See, e.g., Cole v. Illinois, 562 F.3d 812, 816-17 (7th Cir. 2009); Haynes v. Level 3 
Commc’ns, LLC, 456 F.3d 1215, 1224 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing cases); Givens v. Cingular 
Wireless, 396 F.3d 998, 998 (8th Cir. 2005). 
We see no reason to deviate from our sister Courts of Appeal.  A PIP differs 
significantly from the types of employment actions that qualify as adverse.  As illustrated 
by this case, PIPs are typically comprised of directives relating to an employee’s pre-
existing responsibilities.  In other words, far from working a change in employment 
status, a PIP is a method of conveying to an employee the ways in which that employee 
can better perform the duties that he or she already has.  We note that a likely 
consequence of allowing suits to proceed on the basis of a PIP would be more naked 
claims of discrimination and greater frustration for employers seeking to improve 
employees’ performance.  Thus, because Reynolds failed to demonstrate that his PIP was 
accompanied by an adverse change in the conditions of his employment, 6
 Reynolds also argues that he was subjected to a hostile work environment and then 
constructively discharged, and that either of these acts can constitute an adverse 
employment action.  However, a hostile work environment claim requires discrimination 
that is “severe and pervasive,” Weston, 251 F.3d at 426, and a constructive discharge 
 we hold that 
Reynolds’ placement on the PIP did not qualify as an adverse employment action. 
                                              
6 Reynolds asserted at various points in the record that he was told his PIP would be 
accompanied by a pay decrease.  As the District Court observed, however, 
“conspicuously absent in the record is any affirmative statement from Reynolds . . . that 
he ever actually suffered the downgrade or pay decrease.”  Reynolds, 2010 WL 2674045, 
at *12. 
8 
 
claim requires working conditions that are “so unpleasant or difficult that a reasonable 
person would have felt compelled to resign,” Duffy v. Paper Magic Group, Inc., 265 F.3d 
163, 167 (3d Cir. 2001) (quotation marks omitted).  Nothing Reynolds has pointed to in 
the record rises to the level of severity necessary to satisfy these standards. 
 For the above-stated reasons, Reynolds has failed to satisfy his burden of 
demonstrating an adverse employment action, and consequently we need not examine the 
other prongs of a prima facie case.  Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court did 
not err in granting summary judgment on Reynolds’ age discrimination claims. 
B. Retaliation Claim 
 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an ADEA plaintiff “must show: (1) 
that he engaged in protected conduct; (2) that he was subject to an adverse employment 
action subsequent to such activity; and (3) that a causal link exists between the protected 
activity and the adverse action.”  Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 701 (3d Cir. 
1995).  As the District Court points out, Reynolds has failed to identify any evidence 
from which a reasonable jury could infer a causal connection between the submission of 
his age discrimination complaint in December 2004 and any subsequent adverse 
treatment to which he may have been subjected.  Thus, his claim fails. 
*    *    *    *    *  
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the District Court. 
 
